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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines nonrecurring earnings charges following business combinations and the 
characteristics that influence their reporting.  The study uses a sample of 216 business 
combinations in which the acquiring firm reported either goodwill or other asset impairments or 
restructuring charges with respect to a target firm.  The results show that changes in the level of 
CEO cash compensation and institutional ownership are factors that are positively associated 
with nonrecurring earnings charges in the post-acquisition period.  The findings suggest that the 
transparency of nonrecurring transactions subsequent to a business combination is evident with 
the expense treatment of acquisition-related costs. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
his study addresses the following research question: What are the characteristics that influence 
reporting nonrecurring post-acquisition charges (NRCs)?  NRCs are typically one-time earnings 
charges that may encompass restructuring charges and/or asset impairments.  They characteristically 
occur in connection with a plan of a restructuring of the business segment particularly following an acquisition of 
another entity.  The decision to acquire an entity and later report the downsizing of its operations is not only 
observable in the public press, but also in financial reports.  The charges to earnings, although not frequent, are 
usually significant.  Frequent reporting of NRCs diminishes confidence in the transparency of financial reports and 
promotes an inefficient capital market system.  Improper use of acquisition restructuring reserves, as in the case of 
Kimberly Clark Corporation and Cendant Corporation has led to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
mandated financial statement restatements.1  Earnings' press releases typically highlight NRCs transactions with the 
expectation that analysts may ignore the financial effects of the NRCs for valuation purposes.  
 
NRCs have been extensively studied.  Literature shows that NRCs are associated with changes in senior 
management (e.g., Strong and Meyer 1987), NRC firms perform poorly relative to the industry (e.g., Zucca and 
Campbell 1992; Elliott and Shaw 1988), and NRCs produce lower earnings response coefficients (e.g., Elliott and 
Hanna 1996).  NRC firms are also implicated in using earnings management techniques such as “big baths” and 
“income smoothing” (e.g., Zucca and Campbell 1992).  Stock price reaction to NRCs have produced mixed results 
ranging from no reaction (e.g., Zucca and Campbell 1992) to positive reaction (e.g., Francis, Hanna, and Vincent 
1996), and to a negative stock price reaction (e.g., Elliott and Shaw 1988; and Strong and Meyer 1987).  Although 
these studies produce different outcomes, they consistently emphasize the significant managerial discretion 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) provides in the measurement and timing of NRCs.  
Additionally, as recent GAAP has tightened measurement and reporting issues, still the accounting guidance implies 
that NRCs are not normal economic events; therefore, separate and prominent disclosures of NRCs facilitate 
empirical study.  
 
Business combinations2 are well-publicized events.  Equally, the business press publicizes significant 
downsizing, restructuring, and layoffs following a business combination, especially when coupled with CEO 
changes.  Nevertheless, earlier recognition of these earnings charges means less costs to offset any future revenue, 
perhaps not only bolstering CEO future compensation, but also stock prices. 
T 
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Unlike prior research, an examination of NRCs following a business combination provides a unique setting 
to study NRCs because the responsibility for acquisition decision to the implementation of integration strategies lies 
with senior management.  The CEO coordinates the acquisition team necessary for price negotiations and once the 
acquisition is complete, the burden shifts to the integration of the acquired operations.  This undertaking presents 
significant challenges and strains on a newly organized firm creating pressure to justify premiums paid to target 
shareholders through revenue enhancements and cost reductions.  Strategic decisions are made, particularly to 
continue or to exit acquired operations, to justify bid premiums, while adhering to the objectives of the business 
combination.   
 
The business combination setting is also distinctive because CEOs may be motivated to use business 
combinations to increase power over greater resources resulting in higher forms of compensation through cash and 
stock ownership (Jenson 1986).  Roll’s (1986) hubris theory supports the theory that CEOs are overconfident in their 
ability to value a target firm and thus their primary motivation to engage in these transactions would be to increase 
their power domination over a larger firm.  The use of cash compensation rewards managers for making new 
investments while at the same time compensate them for increased risks in managing a larger firm and for the 
subsequent integration of the combining firms.3 
 
Managerial stock ownership is widely used as a mechanism to align managerial with outside interests (e.g., 
Hubbard and Palia 1995).  Although the CEO is primarily responsible for the acquisition decision (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991), external pressure from institutional investors may influence the integration strategies employed by 
the acquiring firm.  Institutional owners monitor firm performance.  They have the ability and resources to do so.  
Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) findings show that significant institutional owners deter managers’ ability to use 
discretionary accruals whether income increasing or decreasing for their own benefit.  Institutional investors, as well 
as manager-owners, have a greater incentive to monitor firm performance especially in the aftermath of a business 
combination to ensure realization of expected revenue and cost synergies.   
 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether CEO cash compensation,4 managerial and 
institutional ownership, are factors that influence reporting NRCs following a business combination.  Other factors, 
such as, accounting method, CEO turnover, firm performance, size, growth, and history of reporting NRCs are also 
considered.  
 
In a sample of 216 business combinations that reported NRCs during the post-acquisition period, the 
empirical analysis finds that CEO compensation and outside institutional ownership, significant factors that 
influence the acquiring firm to report NRCs subsequent to acquisition.  Additionally, this study contributes to the 
literature by expanding the study of NRCs by finding aspects that are associated with the occurrence of NRCs 
unique to business combination setting 
 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review and hypotheses development.  
Section 3 presents the research design, including the regression model, and sample selection process.  Results are 
discussed in Section 4.  Discussion and conclusions are presented in Section 5. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1  NRCS And CEO Cash Compensation 
 
The bonus hypothesis predicts that if earnings are already below the target for bonus calculation, 
management has an incentive to reduce earnings further so that future earnings and bonuses will be greater (Healy 
1985).  Studies also find that CEO compensation increases when NRCs are reported in connection with general 
operations because CEOs are encouraged to restructure (e.g., Adut, Cready, and Lopez 2003; Gaver and Gaver 
1998; Dechow, Huson, and Sloan 1994).  The conclusion reached is that CEO compensation is positively affected 
when the firm downsizes.  Collectively, the conclusion from these studies is that an association between 
compensation and special items appearing on the income statement exists, but the direction of the association may 
not be consistent. 
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Business combinations increase firm size.  Managers may be motivated to increase firm size so to increase 
their sphere of influence and power and thus their compensation.  Jenson (1986) argues that managers are motivated 
to engage in mergers and acquisitions to increase their self-interest in the form of higher stock wealth and 
compensation.  Hubris makes managers overconfident in their ability to value properly a target due to their self-
worth, and managers overpay while enhancing their corporate empire.  Shleifer and Vishny (1988) also argue that 
managers are motivated to employ mergers and acquisitions to boost their own compensation.  Khorana and Zenner 
(1998) find a positive relationship between change in executive cash compensation and the change in firm size due 
to acquisitions, in spite of poor stock performance in the post-acquisition periods. 
 
The recognition of NRCs in connection with business combinations in the form of asset impairments or 
restructuring charges reflects transactions that result in firm downsizing, in which the acquirer is reducing firm size 
in the form of removing assets or human capital during the post-acquisition period.  Not only does the CEO play a 
significant role in the acquisition and restructuring decisions, but also these decisions affect CEO compensation 
(Hayward and Hambrick 1997).  Nevertheless, changes in firm size through contracting activities in connection with 
business combinations may warrant changes in compensation levels.  Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  CEO compensation changes in the post-acquisition periods are positively associated with those 
acquiring firms that report NRCs with respect to a target firm.  
 
2.2  NRCS And Equity Ownership 
 
The long established practice of using equity-based compensation aims to better align shareholder and 
managerial interests.  Managerial ownership also acts as a monitoring device so that managers make decisions and 
take actions that boost shareholder value.  Institutional ownership acts as a monitoring device, especially by 
significant institutional investors.  Significant investors are more vigilant in monitoring operations, such as 
streamlining and reducing costs to establish efficient operations subsequent to acquisition, because these investors 
have the resources to do so. 
 
The actions of institutional investors have been empirically documented.  Mangel and Singh (1993) find 
that institutional ownership enhances CEO accountability especially through their influence on the determination of 
CEO cash compensation.  Bens (2002) also finds that more information was disclosed of restructuring activities 
when there is increased shareholder monitoring.  Chung et al. (2002) contend that significant institutional investors 
inhibit managers’ use of discretionary accruals.  NRCs reflect firm downsizing either through less human or physical 
capital.  Acquisition related synergies should enhance firm performance.  Pressures from significant shareholders to 
do “more with less” will result in improved firm performance following an acquisition.  Therefore, the second and 
third hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive association between NRCs and CEO ownership. 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a positive association between NRCs and institutional ownership. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1.  Models 
 
Univariate tests examine the relationship between NRCs and the independent variables.  Multiple 
regressions are used to examine the association between NRCs and the test variables.  An examination of tolerance 
levels and variance inflation factors of independent variables is used to detect multicollinearity among independent 
variables.  The White test is used to detect heteroscedasticity.  The hypotheses predict that there is an association 
between NRCs and changes in CEO cash compensation, and CEO and institutional ownership.  Control variables, 
based on prior empirical work are also included.  The following regression model is used.  
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g(NRC) = β0 + β1(COMP) + β2(CEOOWN) + β3(INSTITUTE) + β4(METHOD) + β5(POSINC) + β6(NEGINC) + 
β7(RETURN) + β8(CEOCHG) + β9(PERSIST)+ β10(SIZE) + β11(AMKTBK) + β12(TMKTBK) + β13(PRIOR) + 
β14(T0...  T2) + ε 
 
where the dependent variable is as follows: 
 
NRC = Log value of nonrecurring charges that are post-acquisition transactions representing goodwill impairments, 
other asset impairments, and/or restructuring charges specifically identified with the target firm.  The post-
acquisition transactions occurred within three years of the acquisition date and affect the acquirers’ income5.  One-
time fees or other expenses associated with the acquisition (i.e., legal, accounting, regulatory, etc.) are not 
considered for this study.  Direct acquisition costs are also not included. 
 
 The following are the test variables: 
 
COMP = Log value of the dollar change in CEO cash compensation (annual salary and bonus) during the post-
acquisition period,  
CEOOWN = CEO equity ownership percentage as of acquisition date and  
INSTITUTE = Aggregate percentage institutional ownership as filed on Form 13F as of acquisition date.  
 
The control variables are as follows. 
 
METHOD = 1 if the Acquiring firm uses the purchase method of accounting or 0, if the pooling-of-interests method 
is used to account for the business combination.  The purchase method of accounting is the only accepted method 
for business combinations effective July 1, 2001 (SFAS No. 141)6.  The debate over which method of accounting is 
appropriate for business combinations spans decades of research and discussion.  Although accounting choice 
studies document that the pooling-of-interests method creates higher bid premiums (e.g. Robinson and Shane 1990, 
and Nathan 1988), these premiums are not recognized for accounting purposes. 
 
 Pooling may be transparent when it comes to the recognition of the costs associated with business 
combinations because expense treatment is required.  There is little empirical evidence that directly addresses the 
issue.  The pooling-of-interests method requires expensing of all acquisition costs; whereas, under the purchase 
method only indirect costs are expensed.  Further, in purchase accounting, reserves for future losses may be 
recognized as part of the acquisition with an offsetting increase to acquired goodwill that will not appear as a charge 
to future earnings unless the goodwill is either amortized7 or subsequently impaired.  Thus, the transparency of 
NRCs is evident with the use of the pooling-of-interests method for the business combination because the pooling 
procedure requires expense treatment, which is plainly disclosed.  
 
CEOCHG = 1 if there is a change in the CEO between acquisition date and during the post-acquisition periods, or 0 
otherwise.  Although earnings management may be directly implicated as a motivation for lacking disclosure of 
NRCs, at the same time new CEOs may be more likely to place blame for poor performance on the inferior 
judgments of predecessors.  Elliott and Shaw (1988) contend that incoming CEOs consciously overstate losses 
attributable to their predecessors.  
 
Weisbach (1995) also maintains that CEO changes are important events for corporations because they 
imply reversals of poor past judgments.  Weisbach finds that the probability of divesting a previously acquired entity 
at a loss increases when there is a different CEO at the time of the initial acquisition.8  This finding could be 
interpreted as the acquiring CEO being unwilling to give up on a project because it conveys negative signals as to 
the initial acquisition decision.  Bens (2002) finds less restructuring plan disclosures when the restructuring is 
preceded by routine changes in CEOs.  In Elliot and Shaw (1988), 39% of their write-off sample experience changes 
in top management.  Therefore, it is plausible that most NRCs occur when there is change in the CEO during the 
post-acquisition period. 
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PERSIST or earnings persistence is measured as 1 if the firm-years' Eit/Pit falls in portfolios 3 through 8, 
and 0 otherwise.  Eit represents earnings in the year of the post-acquisition activity and Pit represents the year–end 
stock price of the acquiring firm in the year of the post-acquisition transaction.  The ranking procedure follows Adut 
et al. (2003).  The procedure assigns all firm-years with negative values of Eit/Pit a ranking of 1, and groups all 
remaining firm-years into nine equal portfolios with assigned rankings of 2 through 10.  This procedure initially set 
forth by (Baber et al. 1998, 1999), assumes that portfolios 1, 2, 9, and 10 have more transitory items in earnings and 
hence are less persistent than the other middle portfolios.  Similar to Adut et al. (2003), restructuring charges, 
goodwill, and other asset impairments are nonrecurring transactions; therefore, controlling for earnings persistence 
is particularly critical. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that poor past performance-type variables and firm size lead to larger 
write-offs (e.g., Francis et al. 1996; Elliott and Shaw 1988).  Variables that capture acquirer firm performance (RET) 
and size (SIZE) are included in the analysis.  Market-to book ratios in pooling deals are greater than purchase 
method deals (AMKTBK, TMKTBK) and thus are included as control variables (e.g. Nathan and Dunne 1991).  
Similarly, the model controls for income before NRCs, income taxes, discontinued operations, extraordinary items, 
cumulative effect of accounting changes is equaled to 1 if positive (POSINC) 0, otherwise and 1 if negative 
(NEGINC) (e.g. Adut et al. 2003 and Gaver and Gaver 1998). 
 
PRIOR is used to control for the history of the acquiring firm in reporting NRCs for the likelihood of 
reporting NRCs may be influenced by a history of similar past transactions (e.g. Francis, Hanna and Vincent 1996, 
and Elliott and Hanna 1996).  PRIOR is coded as 1 if the acquirer reported a special item (Computstat Item No.  
A17) in the year prior to the NRC, and 0 otherwise.  T0, T1, and T2 are used to control for the year of the NRC, with 
T0 being the acquisition year, T1 is one year following the acquisition, and T2 represents two years following the 
acquisition year. 
 
3.2 Sample Selection  
 
The initial sample of merger and acquisition transactions is obtained from Mergerstat with the criteria that 
the buyer and seller are domestic publicly held companies whose stock trades on a recognized exchange, and who 
file with the SEC.  Additional requirements are that the acquirer obtains control of the target through acquisition of 
target stock.  The sample covers business combinations that are completed during the years 1995 through 1998, 
inclusive.  This procedure provides an initial sample of 1,058 transactions.  However, for various reasons, including 
availability of data on Compustat, and through closer inspection of transactions, the initial sample size for analysis 
reduces to 638 observations.   
 
Financial statements and footnotes included on either Forms 10-K or 10-Q of the acquiring firm are 
examined up to three years following a business combination for the reporting of either goodwill or other asset 
impairments and restructuring charges that are predominantly severance charges.  The NRCs are specifically 
identified with the target firm, and result in an income statement effect for the Acquiring firm.9  This procedure 
reduces the sample to 216.  NRCs do not include the costs to remove duplicate facilities and general firm 
restructuring is not considered.  Changes in CEO between the acquisition date and post-acquisition periods is 
determined through examination of proxy statements.  Institutional ownership is determined by aggregating 
ownership as reported on Form 13F as filed with the SEC as of acquisition date.  ExecuComp and proxy statements 
are used to obtain CEO compensation data.  All other financial data is obtained from Compustat. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 
A distribution of business combinations by year and industry appears in Table 1.  Most of the business 
combination sample is from 1997 and is largely represented by the manufacturing industry. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Business Combinations 
 
Panel A: Acquisition Values by Year 
($millions) 
 
Acquisition Year Observations Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
1995 27 2,053 620 34 13,000 
1996 50 1,345 229 3 19,500 
1997 79 1334 365 9 14,491 
1998 60 2,996 335 3 43,158 
 
Panel B: Distribution by Industry 
 
Industry SIC Acquirers Targets 
Mining 1000-1400 5 6 
Manufacturing 2000-3990 73 67 
Transportation 4011-4899 10 10 
Utilities 4900-4991 8 8 
Wholesale & Retail 5000-5990 21 20 
Financial Services 6021-6799 53 57 
Other Services 7000-8750 46 48 
Total  216 216 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Continuous Variables 
 Mean Minimum Maximum Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
NRC 5.453 2.283 15.725 4.530 2.386 
COMP 2.981 0.000 4.084 2.964 0.415 
CEOOWN 0.029 0.000 0.552 0.001 0.072 
INSTITUTE 0.438 0.000 0.935 0.416 0.234 
RETURN 0.113 -0.670 1.414 0.113 0.296 
SIZE 3.328 1.352 5.809 3.243 0.864 
AMKTBK 3.812 0.000 9.279 3.061 2.380 
TMKTBK 3.116 0.000 9.743 2.528 2.202 
 
Panel B: Definition of Variables 
 
NRC The log value of nonrecurring charges that are post-acquisition transactions representing goodwill impairments, other 
asset impairments, and/or restructuring charges specifically identified with the Target firm.  The post-acquisition transactions 
occurred within three years of the acquisition date (the “post-acquisition period”), are not capitalized direct costs, and included in 
the Acquirers’ income. 
COMP The log value of the dollar change in CEO cash compensation (annual salary and bonus) during the post-
acquisition period. 
CEOOWN CEO equity ownership percentage as of acquisition date. 
INSTITUTE Institutional equity ownership percentage as of acquisition date. 
METHOD The method used for the business combination accounting, Purchase = 1, Pooling = 0. 
POSINC  Pretax income before special items is positive then 1, otherwise, 0. 
NEGINC  Pretax income before special items is negative then 1, otherwise, 0. 
RETURN Average Acquirers’ return on common equity during the post-acquisition period. 
CEOCHG Change in CEO between acquisition date and post-acquisition periods (1=yes, 0=no). 
PERSIST  Firms’ years E/P ratio falls in portfolios 3 through 8, 0 otherwise. 
SIZE  The log value of Acquirer and Target firms’ combined total assets at acquisition date. 
AMKTBK The Acquirer market-to-book-value of equity ratio at acquisition date. 
TMKTBK The Target market-to-book-value of equity ratio at acquisition date. 
PRIOR  Acquirer reported special items in year prior to acquisition (1=yes, 0=no). 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(p-values) 
N =216 
  NRC COMP CEOOWN INSTITUTE METHOD POSINC NEGINC RETURN CEOCHG PERSIT SIZE AMKTBK TMKTBK PRIOR 
NRC 1 0.290 -0.041 0.286 -0.176 -0.165 0.125 0.040 -0.097 -0.027 0.227 0.071 0.027 -0.042 
  (<.0001) (0.552) (<.0001) (0.009) (0.015) (0.066) (0.558) (0.153) (0.689) (0.001) (0.295) (0.689) (0.537) 
COMP  1 -0.287 0.274 -0.068 0.029 -0.037 0.291 -0.123 0.193 0.642 0.165 0.119 -0.038 
    (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.321) (0.675) (0.583) (<.0001) (0.071) (0.004) (<.0001) (0.015) (0.079) (0.574) 
CEOOWN   1 -0.173 0.089 -0.135 0.068 -0.236 0.026 -0.196 -0.294 -0.029 0.015 -0.025 
     (0.010) (0.193) (0.047) (0.317) (0.001) (0.701) (0.004) (<.0001) (0.668) (0.830) (0.718) 
INSTITUTE    1 -0.091 -0.180 0.151 -0.170 -0.048 0.094 0.131 0.073 0.072 0.006 
      (0.182) (0.008) (0.026) (0.013) (0.482) (0.165) (0.054) (0.282) (0.289) (0.927) 
METHOD     1 -0.083 0.062 -0.081 0.071 -0.156 -0.145 -0.416 -0.150 -0.012 
       (0.225) (0.366) (0.237) (0.293) (0.021) (0.033) (<.0001) (0.027) (0.859) 
POSINC      1 -0.522 0.009 -0.069 0.018 0.328 -0.184 -0.166 0.305 
        (<.0001) (0.892) (0.310) (0.789) (<.0001) (0.007) (0.014) (<.0001) 
NEGINC       1 0.011 -0.120 -0.037 -0.236 0.079 0.118 0.553 
         (0.868) (0.078) (0.586) (0.000) (0.248) (0.083) (<.0001) 
RETURN        1 -0.156 0.058 0.215 0.039 0.019 0.047 
          (0.022) (0.398) (0.002) (0.575) (0.784) (0.499) 
CEOCHG         1 -0.194 -0.137 -0.001 0.040 -0.130 
           (0.004) (0.043) (0.985) (0.556) (0.056) 
PERSIT          1 0.198 0.139 0.045 -0.013 
            (0.003) (0.040) (0.510) (0.848) 
SIZE           1 0.021 -0.001 0.007 
             (0.753) (0.987) (0.923) 
AMKTBK            1 0.319 -0.068 
              (<.0001) (0.319) 
TMKTBK             1 0.014 
               (0.835) 
PRIOR              1 
 
See Table 2 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics.  The descriptive statistics show that the mean NRC for all sample 
firms is $5.453 (log value) and the mean dollar change in CEO cash compensation during the post-acquisition period 
is $2.981 (log value).  The mean ownership by CEOs and institutions is approximately 3 and 44 percent, 
respectively. 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
The variable NRC is positively correlated with COMP (p<.0001) and with INSTITUTE (p<.0001).  There 
is a negative correlation between NRC and CEOOWN; however, the correlation is not significant.  The correlation 
results indicate that there is a positive association between NRCs and changes in CEO compensation during the 
post-acquisition period (COMP), and institutional ownership at acquisition date (INSTITUTE). 
 
NRCs are also positively correlated with NEGINC (p=0.066) and with SIZE (p=0.001) and negatively 
correlated with METHOD (p=0.009) and with POSINC (p=0.015).  The correlation results for the control variables 
indicate that NRCs are positively associated with firm size (SIZE) and with pretax loss before special item 
(NEGINC and POSINC).  The correlation results for the control variables indicate that there is an association 
between NRCs and the use of the pooling-of-interests method for the business combination (METHOD). 
 
4.2  Univariate Tests 
 
 
Table 4 
Univariate Results 
 
 No. of   
Samples Observations Mean P-Values 
    
CEO Ownership 113 5.243  
No CEO Ownership 103 5.695 0.164 
Total 216   
    
Institute Ownership 212 5.449  
No Institute Ownership 4 5.829 0.753 
Total 216   
    
Purchase 91 4.964  
Pooling 125 5.815 0.009 
Total 216   
    
Positive Income 103 4.675  
Negative Income 113 5.743 0.015 
Total 216   
    
CEO Change 47 5.015  
No CEO Change 169 5.578 0.153 
Total 216   
    
Persistence 109 5.392  
No Persistence 107 5.522 0.689 
Total 216   
    
Prior NRC 146 5.386  
No Prior NRC 70 5.599 0.537 
Total 216   
 
See Table 2 for definitions of variables. 
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Table 4 presents the univariate tests.  The mean value of NRCs for the pooling-of-interests sub-sample 
(5.815) is significantly greater than the mean value for the purchase accounting observations (4.675), p=0.009.  
Mean values of NRCs for the sub-samples of no CEO ownership, no institutional ownership, negative pretax income 
before special items, no CEO change, no earnings persistence, and no prior history of special items are greater than 
their respective comparable sub-samples, but the differences in the means are not significant. 
 
4.3 Multivariate Regression Results 
 
4.3.1 Results on Test Variables 
 
Table 5 presents the regression results.  The coefficient for the variable COMP is positive and significant at 
the p=0.000 level.  The coefficient for the variable INSTITUTE is positive and significant at the p=0.000 level.  
CEOOWN is also positive, but not significant.  The results show that there is a positive association between NRCs 
and changes in CEO compensation during the post-acquisition period and institutional ownership.  These results 
support hypotheses H1 and H3.   
 
 
Table 5 
Regression Results 
 
VARIABLE Parameter Estimate t Value Pr > |t| 
INTERCEPT 2.405 4.785 0.000 
COMP 1.061 4.771 0.000 
CEOOWN 1.107 0.802 0.423 
INSTITUTE 1.854 5.213 0.000 
METHOD -1.075 -8.674 0.000 
POSINC -0.572 -1.478 0.140 
NEGINC 0.849 1.936 0.054 
RETURN -0.091 -0.394 0.694 
CEOCHG -0.470 -2.633 0.009 
PERSIST -0.787 -5.277 0.000 
SIZE 0.384 3.342 0.001 
AMKTBK -0.067 -2.818 0.005 
TMKTBK -0.050 -1.906 0.057 
PRIOR -0.788 -1.979 0.049 
T0 -1.093 -5.012 0.000 
T1 -0.858 -4.987 0.000 
T2 -1.343 -7.525 0.000 
F-VALUE 13.830   
ADJUSTED R2 0.488   
OBSERVATIONS 216   
 
See Table 2 for definition of variables. 
 
 
4.3.2 Results on Control Variables 
 
As expected, the significant negative coefficient for METHOD indicates that NRCs are associated with the 
use of the pooling-of-interests method for the business combination.  Similarly, the significant positive coefficient 
for SIZE indicates that NRCs are associated with the combined size of the acquirer and target firms.  In addition, the 
significant negative coefficient on PERSIST indicates that NRCs are associated with earnings that are not persistent.  
Contrary to expectations, there are significant negative associations between NRCs and CEOCHG, and with PRIOR, 
indicating that NRCs occur when the decision for the business combination and the subsequent downsizing is made 
by the same CEO and when there is no prior history of reporting special items by the acquiring firm.  
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5.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study is based on 216 business combinations over a four-year period from 1995 through 1998.  The 
study analyzes those business combinations during a three-year period in which the acquiring firm reported goodwill 
or other asset impairments, or restructuring charges as they specifically relate to the target firm and affect the 
acquiring firms’ income.  The study examines whether the post-acquisition transactions are influenced by the CEO’s 
change in cash compensation during the post-acquisition period or by the equity ownership of the CEO and 
institutional investors at acquisition date.   
 
The findings show that post-acquisition transactions that reflect acquiring firm downsizing with respect to 
the target firm are positively associated with changes in the CEO’s cash compensation during the post-acquisition 
period.  The results suggest that the magnitude of the post-acquisition transaction is influenced by the CEO’s self-
interest in the form of cash compensation.  Further, the results show that the monitoring effect of institutional 
investors influences NRCs.  
 
This study is limited to the extent that is only examines acquisition related charges that are recognized as a 
component of income and does not include acquisition-related costs that are capitalized under the purchase method 
or charges that may be reported by the target firm during the stub period, which is the period before the completion 
of the business combination. 
 
This study has several contributions.  This study extends previous research of the association between CEO 
compensation and restructuring activities and finds that CEOs are also encouraged through enhanced compensation 
to downsize following a business combination.  The findings also indicate that greater outside monitoring may lead 
to frequent financial restructuring following an acquisition.     
 
The results show that the expectation that the purchase accounting method will lead to more NRCs may be 
misguided because differences in accounting procedures for acquisition-related costs contribute more to 
transparency than the transaction itselfx.  Therefore, the proposed change by the FASB in the Exposure Draft, 
Business Combinations, to require expensing of acquisition-related costs may improve the transparency of business 
combination transactions.  A future area of research that may be worthwhile to examine is the frequency and factors 
affecting the likelihood of post-acquisition NRCs now that acquisition accounting requires use of the purchase 
method. 
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EXHIBIT 
 
Example of NRCs (asset write-down and restructuring charges) 
(Excerpt from Harbinger Corp. 1997 Form 10-K, filed with the SEC on March 31, 1998, acquisition of Premenos 
Technology Corp., a sample observation). 
 
Item 7. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF 
OPERATIONS. 
 
In connection with the HNS, STI, Acquion, Atlas and Premenos acquisitions, the Company incurred $2.0 
million, $12.4 million, $2.5 million, $2.0 million, and $15.3 million, respectively, for acquisition related expenses, 
asset write-downs and integration costs incurred.  Approximately $8.0 million of the costs and expenses incurred in 
connection with the acquisitions of HNS, STI, Acquion, Atlas, and Premenos were Integration Activity Costs which 
may recur in other expense categories in the future and may result in an increase in some expense categories as a 
percentage of total revenues.  The Company also incurred $3.8 million in restructuring charges related to increasing 
synergies among all operating divisions as a result of recent acquisitions. 
 
Notes to Consolidated Statements. 
 
2. ACQUISITIONS. 
 
On December 19, 1997, the Company acquired Premenos, a Delaware corporation based in Concord, 
California.  In connection with the transaction, which was accounted for using the pooling-of-interests method of 
accounting, the Company issued 5,358,655 shares of its common stock in exchange for all of the shares of Premenos 
common stock.  All Premenos options and warrants were converted into the Company's options and warrants in 
accordance with the conversion ratio. 
 
In connection with the Premenos acquisition, the Company incurred a charge of $15.3 million in 1997 for 
acquisition related expenses, asset write-downs and integration costs incurred (see Note 15). 
 
15. CHARGE FOR PURCHASED IN-PROCESS PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, WRITE-OFF OF SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT COSTS, ACQUISITION RELATED, AND OTHER ONE-TIME CHARGES 
 
The Company incurred $3.8 million in restructuring charges related to increasing synergies among all 
operating divisions as a result of recent acquisitions.  The restructuring resulted in the termination of 82 employees 
across several departments including research and development, customer service, marketing, administrative, and 
finance and other areas.  As of December 31, 1997, the Company had actually paid $261,000 in termination benefits 
to former employees. 
 
Approximately $8.0 million of the costs and expenses incurred in connection with the acquisitions of HNS, 
STI, Acquion, Atlas, and Premenos include certain internal expense allocations which may recur in other expense 
categories in the future and may result in an increase in some expense categories as a percentage of total revenues.  
The Company anticipates additional merger related charges totaling $10-$15 million in the first  
quarter of 1998. 
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
                                                           
1 In the 1995 merger between Kimberly Clark Corporation and Scott Paper Co., a $1.44 billion reserve for restructuring charges 
was established, and in later years allocated to different projects not associated with the merger and eventually systematically 
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reversed to earnings.  Cendant Corporation, in connection with its 1996 merger with Ideon Group Inc. intentionally overstated 
merger reserves that are later used for other purposes other than its original intent, including reversals to income as needed.  Once 
Cendant exhausted the Ideon reserve, there was a greater need for the Cendant/HFS merger in 1997 to establish additional 
inflated merger reserves (see SEC Enforcement Release Nos. 1542 and 1272). 
2 The term business combination is synonymous with mergers and acquisitions meaning the acquisition by a corporation of a 
controlling interest in the stock of another corporation. 
3 As an example, see S. Thurm’s The “I Must Do a Merger” Bonus as reported in The Wall Street Journal dated April 6, 2004, in 
which the CEO of Juniper Networks received a bonus for new business acquisitions aimed at growth opportunities, and the CEO 
of J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. was rewarded $10 million for completing the integration between J. P. Morgan and Chase 
Manhattan. 
4 The use of cash compensation is crucial to this study (e.g., Dechow et al. 1994; Gaver and Gaver 1998; Adut et al. 2003), 
because annual cash salary and bonus, unlike equity-based compensation, is readily assignable to a specific reporting period 
corresponding to the reporting of post-acquisition transactions.  Further, cash-based compensation is measurable and not subject 
to valuation judgments as in the case of equity-based compensation such as options. 
5 In a separate analysis of size-contracting activities following an acquisition, a sample of 855 acquisitions of a controlling 
interest in another entity during 1994 through 1998, inclusive, reveals 764 contracting transactions were reported through the 
year 2000.  Of that amount, 85% of the size-contracting transactions (restructuring charges, goodwill, and other asset 
impairments), with respect to the acquired target firm were reported within three years of the acquisition date.  Therefore, NRCs 
through t + 2, two years following the acquisition year t, to capture the vast majority of the NRCs. 
6 The FASB is proposing the use of the acquisition method, which will supersede the purchase method of accounting for business 
combinations.  The acquisition method limits the capitalization of acquisition-related costs to those that meet the definition of a 
liability on acquisition date in accordance with SFAS No.  146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities. 
7 SFAS No. 142 Intangible Assets effective after December 15, 2001 prohibits amortization of goodwill. 
8 Weisbach (1995) and Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) found that the circumstances of CEO departures, forced or voluntary, are 
not significant factors in explaining the likelihood of divestitures. 
9 While examining financial statement footnotes or MD&A disclosures, clear references to the target firm is a requirement for 
inclusion in the sample.  Otherwise, any other NRC transactions reported by the acquiring firm were not included.  In addition, 
NRCs must reflect an income statement effect.  It is acknowledged that although “reserves” for losses may be accrued for as part 
of the acquisition cost when the purchase method is used, these items are direct acquisition costs and are not considered NRCs for 
this study.  This situation is generally due to inconsistent and/or inadequate disclosures of the purchase accounting entry under 
APB No. 16.  Further, NRCs may be recognized by the target firm before acquisition (known as the “stub period”) under both 
accounting methods.  Information as to target firm NRCs between acquisition announcement and completion dates is generally 
not available and thus not included in this sample.  See Exhibit A for examples. 
x See Jennings, Palepu, and Petroni (1999). 
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